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We introduce a new data set recording the vote of every Justice in
18,812 Supreme Court cases decided between 1838 and 1949. When com-
bined with existing data sets, our new data allow us to examine votes in all
cases through 2009. We use this data to address previously unanswerable
questions about the president's ability to appoint Supreme Court Justices of
similar ideology. Surprisingly, history shows that the president's odds of
appointing a Justice who sides with appointees of his party have been no bet-
ter than a coin flip. We find no evidence that divided government at the time
of nomination increased the rate of appointees who voted across party lines.
These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that appointments bring the Court
in line with majoritarian views. Indeed, many failed appointments occurred
when a majority of the Senate and the president were of the same party. The-
se mavericks are not outliers, but rather are part of a larger pattern of appoin-
tees whose votes departed or drifted away from executive expectations at
remarkable frequency throughout our nation's history.
I. INTRODUCTION
"I could carve out of a banana a Judge with more backbone than
that!" - A disappointed Theodore Roosevelt, after hearing of Jus-
tice Holmes's vote in Northern Securities Co. v. United StatesI
* Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
** Adjunct Associate Professor, Northwestern University, Financial Economist,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of
Economic Research. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not reflect those of the Federal Reserve System. We thank the University of Mich-
igan students who helped gather and code our historical Supreme Court voting rec-
ords for their tireless efforts.
1. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 55 (5th ed.
2008).
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Can the president confidently predict the ideology of a Supreme Court
appointee? Voters seem to think so. In 2008, polls found that the majority of
voters considered appointments to the Court an "important factor" in deter-
mining their votes. 2 More than one in six voters considered it the most im-
portant factor, ahead of even war and the economy.3 The desire to control the
nomination process is not a recent phenomenon. More than two-thirds of
registered voters listed Supreme Court appointments as an important factor in
deciding their vote in the 2000 presidential election, and the Supreme Court
has been a plank on presidential platforms since 1896.4
Voters' desire to influence the Court stands in tension with the notion
that the Court is a counter-majoritarian institution. This view of the Court has
fueled the legal academy's "obsessive" discourse5 on the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. 6 Still, political scientists and a number of legal scholars have ques-
tioned whether the Court is, in fact, counter-majoritarian.7 Though Justices
themselves are not elected, elected officials appoint them. Thus, at the time
of appointment, Justices should reflect dominant political views.8 Most ar-
2. John Von Kanel, Exit Poll: Supreme Court Factor, CNN POLITICS:
POLITICAL TICKER (Nov 5, 2008, 2:26 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2008
/11/05/exit-polls-the-supreme-court.
3. Toplines - Supreme Court Justices - May 19-20, 2008, RASMUSSEN REP.,
(May 19-20, 2008) available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/
olitics/questions/pt surveyquestions/may 2008/toplines supreme court justices
may_19_20 2008 (survey of 800 likely voters).
4. Supreme Court Nominations Important to Presidential Race, Poll Says,
ASSOCIATED PRESS ARCHIVE, July 1, 2000, available at http://infoweb.newsbank.
com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb?pproduct-NewsBank&p theme=aggregated5&p acti
on=doc&p docid=0F89C1B4EF4A62OB&pdocnum=13&p queryname=9. Search-
able text of presidential Platforms is available at the American Presidency Project.
Political Party Platforms, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presiden
cy.ucsb.edu/platforms.php (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
5. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 161 (2002).
6. Alexander Bickel famously coined the phrase "counter-majoritarian difficul-
ty" in his 1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1986). The difficulty arises when une-
lected judges override actions of elected officials, and attempts to justify this aspect of
judicial review have gripped the legal academy. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 155,
161.
7. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (describing this position).
8. In his seminal 1957 article, majoritarian Robert Dahl asserted that frequent
appointments ensure "the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out
of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States." Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 284-85 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J.
563, 570 (2001); see also Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
[Vol. 761000
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guments for a majoritarian Court depend on the president's and Senate's abil-
ity to appoint Justices whose decisions reflect their views.9
The president's ability to appoint ideologically compatible Justices is a
critical issue for both voters and Supreme Court scholars. Is there any reason
to think presidents actually possess this power? If they do, one would expect
Justices appointed by the same president, and perhaps by presidents of the
same party, to vote together at a higher rate. Likewise, if appointments bring
the Court in line with majoritarian views, then at least in times of unified
government one would expect Justices to align with appointees of the same
president or party more often than not.'0
But the results of presidents' Supreme Court appointments are mixed.
Consider the different experiences of George H.W. Bush and his son. Both of
George W. Bush's appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito, have similar
voting records, which are thought to align with executive preferences. The
first Bush Administration did not fare as well. While Justice Clarence Thom-
as votes with Republican appointees at a high rate, David Souter voted with
Democratic appointees at just as high a rate. 11 It is no surprise that appoin-
tees sometimes will deviate from executive preferences, but how often are
such disappointments likely to occur? Was Souter's appointment a product
of divided government, or was it part of a larger pattern of Justices who de-
part from executive preferences no matter who controls the Senate?
Unfortunately, the data available to previous researchers have been too
limited to answer this question. Leading Supreme Court scholars have been
"especially handicapped" in their ability "to offer information on voting be-
havior prior to the Vinson Court era."12 Indeed the "greatest single resource
of data on the Court,"l 3 Harold J. Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court Database,
Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 549, 605 (2009) (noting role of judicial appoint-
ments in constitutional change).
9. Pildes, supra note 7, at 139-40.
10. That is, on contested issues, Justices should align most closely with others
appointed by presidents or parties reflecting like majoritarian views.
I1. The "first President Bush's selection of Justice Souter highlight[s] the risk
that agents can deviate from the policy preferences of their principals." HAROLD
KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 25 (2005).
12. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS
& DEVELOPMENTS xxiii (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
13. Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholar-
ship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819,
848 (2002) (quoting Lee Epstein, Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83
JUDICATURE 224, 225 (2000)). The Database's standardized coding and machine-
readable format makes it the go-to source for most studies. See id. at 830-3 1. In
addition to the Supreme Court Database, the Harvard Law Review publishes infor-
mation on Justices' decisional patterns for each term. See, e.g., The Supreme Court,
2009 Term - the Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2010). Although the Harvard
Law Review began publishing annual statistics in 1929, versions published through
1940 did not include detailed voting records. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Empirical Le-
2011] I001
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offers Justice-centered voting records dating back to only 1946.14 With just
twenty-seven Supreme Court appointments since this time, the sample of
Justices whose voting records are available to empirical legal scholars is too
small to draw statistically confident conclusions about the president's proba-
bility of failure.' 5 Scholars have begun making inroads by looking as far
back as the 1930s.'6 Still, existing studies leave almost twice as many ap-
pointments unexamined as examined. They omit several appointments made
during earlier periods of divided government.
Our Article addresses this shortcoming. We introduce a new data set
containing the Supreme Court voting alignments for every written opinion
issued from 1838 through 1949. This data set contains 18,812 cases and rep-
resents an approximate three-fold increase in quantitative voting data availa-
ble to Supreme Court scholars. We build on past historical studiesl 7 and
make possible the first comprehensive study of precise voting coalitions for
early Supreme Court cases.' 8
gal Studies Before 1940: A Bibliographic Essay, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 925,
949-50 (2009).
14. Harold J. Spaeth, Current Dataset: 2011 Release 03, SUPREME CT.
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) [hereinafter
SUPREME COURT DATABASE].
15. Assume that an appointment can be classified as one of two possibilities -
success or failure. With only 27 observations, the confidence interval on any estimate
of the president's unobservable probability of success will always be between 10.5%
and 29.5% wide. Our count excludes the very recent appointment of Justice Kagan
and Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice.
16. Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who,
When, and How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2007) [hereinafter
Drift]; Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 69, 70 (2010).
17. Some studies tally authors of different types of opinion. See ALBERT P.
BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL
STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 87-102 (1987); SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1980: AN INDEX TO OPINIONS ARRANGED BY
JUSTICE (Linda A. Blanford & Patricia Russell Evans eds., 1983) [hereinafter,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES]. Others present general voting trends or
data for more limited groups of cases. We do not attempt to include a complete list,
but examples of this literature include: DREW NOBLE LANIER, OF TIME AND JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 129-75 (2003) (studies generally liberal or conservative voting trends from
1888-1997); C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U S.
Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941); C. Neal Tate & Roger
Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Su-
preme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460 (1991).
18. To date, this has been an important but neglected area of study. The National
Science Foundation recently awarded Professors Epstein, Martin, Ruger, Segal,
Spaeth and Whittington a collaborative research grant to backdate the Supreme Court
Database. See, e.g., Award Search, NAT'L SCI. FOUND., http://nsf.gov/award search/
(search awards SES 0921869, SES 0923665, SES 0919149, & SES 0918613) (last
1002 [Vol. 76
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Our new data allow us to address previously unanswerable questions
about the president's power to appoint Justices with the Senate's "Advice and
Consent." 9 A powerful Senate could either keep a nominee off the Court or
drive the president to nominate a more moderate Justice than he would oth-
erwise prefer. Historical accounts of failed nominees make clear that we
cover a contentious period in which divided government often led to a nomi-
nee's defeat. 20 We know far less, however, about the Justices who made it on
the Court. Did the confirmation process make it more difficult for a president
to appoint Justices who shared his ideology?
The literature on Supreme Court appointees is rife with competing anec-
dotes of executive success rates. To be clear, our discussion of satisfaction or
disappointment in overall voting records focuses on a single measure, ideolo-
gy. It does not account for merit or other factors relevant to evaluating a Jus-
tice. But assessments of ideology alone provoke considerable differences of
opinion. Some scholars highlight presidents disappointed with their appoin-
tees' treatment of key executive policies,21 and luminaries such as John Hart
Ely have wondered whether disappointment should be considered the "rule
rather [than] the exception."22 Others claim that these accounts are "more
myth than reality" 23 or find it difficult to set a clear benchmark for measuring
visited Sept. 19, 2011). The Supreme Court Database contains a link to the collection
status for this project. See Collection Status, SUPREME CT. DATABASE, http://scdb
.wustl.edu/about.php?s=2 (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). This comprehensive historical
database will provide a "treasure trove" of data for all full opinion cases going back to
2 U.S. Reports and enable further work in this area.
19. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
20. Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SuP.
CT. REV. 381, 383 (2010); Keith E. Whittington, Presidents, Senates, and Failed
Supreme Court Nominations, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 401, 412 (2006). Our time period is
also dynamic, as "one-fourth of the total" nominations from 1811 to 1894 "went
down to defeat" before the long period of acquiescence in the twentieth century.
MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
9 (2004).
21. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1387 (1998); see Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths:
Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283,
1294, 1297, 1298-99 (1986).
22. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 47 (1980); TERRI JENNINGS PERETFI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT I 1 -
12 (1999) (gathering this and similar statements by Charles Warren and Alexander
Bickel).
23. Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307, 324 (2001); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR
HISTORY 50 (1985); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 19 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2372 (2006) (citing LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 130-32
(2005)); David A. Strauss, Memo to the President (and His Opponents): Ideology Still
2011] I003
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executive disappointment.24 Still others blame disappointment on the con-
straining effect of an opposing-party Senate25 or warn against omitting the
Senate when crafting proxies for an appointee's ideology.26
Our extended time period allows us to compute clear benchmarks and
conduct the first quantitative examination of presidential success rates over a
27
170-year period. We proceed as follows: In Part 11, we describe our data
collection process and methodology for measuring voting alignments. We
also show that our measures of agreement based on count data reflect the
information contained in another leading measure of judicial ideology, Mar-
tin-Quinn scores.
In Part III, we present our general results. Aggregate voting records
show that Justices generally agree with appointees of the same party about as
often as they agree with appointees of the other party. Most surprising, how-
ever, are the voting records of individual Justices. They show that presidents
fare far better with certain appointees than others, and that they often have
appointed ideologically incompatible Justices. Just under half of the Justices
we studied sided with appointees of the other party most of the time.
We find no evidence that this outcome can be attributed solely to divid-
ed government, and most of our results remain stable over time. In very re-
Counts, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 49, 49-50 (2007), http://www.law.northwest
ern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/22/.
24. PERETTI, supra note 22 at 114-15, 130 (finding disappointment "perhaps up
to 25 percent of the time" but noting methodological difficulties of distinguishing
among presidential surprises, mistakes, and failures).
25. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1068-69 (2001); see also CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK,
STRATEGIC SELECTION 140 (2007); Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A
Principled Approach to the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 131, 157-58 (2009).
26. Lee Espstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 95-
96 (2002).
27. We build on earlier studies that measure Justices' ideology based on liberal
or conservative case outcomes. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 312-26 (2002); Jef-
frey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme Court
Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 567 tbl.4 (2000). Although we do not generally
address studies of federal courts of appeals, the same measures have been applied to
those judges as well. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Parti-
sanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998) (measuring deference to conservative or
liberal agency decisions); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 314-15 (2004)
(measuring ideological voting in a wide array of cases). For a recent study measuring
ideology with a method agnostic to case outcomes in federal courts of appeals, see
Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the
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cent years, though, the Court has become more polarized as the magnitude of
Justices' agreement with one side or the other has increased. Thus, while the
stakes in a given appointment are higher than ever, history gives no assurance
that a Justice will side with the party of his or her appointing president.
In Part IV, we apply these individual voting records to three lines of his-
torical inquiry. First, we assess prominent examples of disappointment, in-
cluding Justice Salmon Chase in 1870 and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in
1904. As Felix Frankfurter recounted, these Justices let down Presidents
Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt on key executive policies:
Chief Justice Chase declared unconstitutional the Legal Tender Act
of the President who appointed him and of the Administration of
which he was a member. So also Mr. Justice Holmes decided
against the Government in the Northern Securities case, Roose-
velt's pet litigation, although the latter thought it his duty to put on
the Supreme Bench only men who would sustain "My Policies."28
Historical accounts differ as to whether Holmes let down Roosevelt in just the
Northern Securities case or with his voting record as a whole.29 We also do
not know how his complete voting record compares to that of Justice William
Day, who also was thought to have disappointed Roosevelt. Overall voting
records allow us to identify whether these and other executive disappoint-
ments hinged on a few key cases or on overall voting records.
Our second historical inquiry is a comprehensive examination of indi-
vidual voting records for Justices nominated during times of divided govern-
ment in the nineteenth century. Again, our data offer the first opportunity to
assess Justices' overall voting records during this important but previously
inaccessible time period. Like our general findings, these records fail to show
that divided government led to Justices with significantly more moderate
voting records.
Our last historical inquiry is a preliminary measure of whether past vot-
ing patterns are consistent with ideological drift. This phenomenon, in which
Justices' ideologies change over time, has been documented in contemporary
data.30 Our records show that Justices' historical voting patterns also are
consistent with ideological drift.
28. Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REv. 661, 662-63 (1931)
(footnotes omitted) (citing N. Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870)).
29. ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 135 (Samuel
Krislov ed., 1971) (explaining that while "Holmes apparently failed Roosevelt but
once on a matter of major concern," Roosevelt still claimed him a "bitter disappoint-
ment . . . because of his general attitude." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 128.
30. See Drifi. supra note 16, at 1485-87.
2011] 1005
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In Part V, we conclude that a large percentage of Justices have disap-
pointed presidents with their overall voting records. This outcome has con-
tinued to occur at a high and stable frequency since 1838. We find no corre-
lation between an opposing-party Senate and the rate of appointees who vote
across party lines. Indeed, many prominent historical examples of failed ap-
pointments occurred when the Senate and president were of the same party.
These mavericks are not outliers. Instead, they are part of a larger pattern of
appointees whose votes depart or drift away from executive expectations
more often than voters may think.
II. METHODOLOGY
We compiled a comprehensive record of votes for every written opinion
the Supreme Court issued from 1838 to 1949. There are 18,812 case citations
for this time period. We relied on the previous work of the Supreme Court
Historical Society and eighteen University of Michigan students to help gath-
er and code voting records.
We tailored our data collection strategy to meet two primary goals. The
first goal was to facilitate comparison with leading studies of contemporary
voting alignments. The second goal was to ensure accuracy by eliminating as
much discretion as possible in our students' coding.31 As a further guarantee
of accuracy, we used a double-entry system that required two students to in-
dependently review and code each entry.
With these goals in mind, we assembled our database in four main steps:
1. To obtain a complete list of written opinions that the Court is-
sued between 1838 and 1949, we consulted the Case Citation Find-
er on the United States Supreme Court's website.32 It sets forth the
official citations, "in the form recommended by the Reporter of
Decisions, for every signed, per curiam, or in-chambers opinion
published (or soon to be published) in the United States Reports." 3 3
This listing yielded 18,812 case citations for our review.
2. Next, we identified the subset of non-unanimous cases. To do
so, we used an index created by the Supreme Court Historical So-
ciety to identify every case in which any Justice authored a non-
31. Thus we avoid more nuanced coding decisions that are part of the broader
information contained in the Supreme Court Database. See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding
Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480, 517 (2009) (critiquing "issue" coding in the Supreme Court
Database).
32. See Case Citation Finder, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supreme court.gov/
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majority opinion.34 The index provides a comprehensive list of
opinions authored by each Justice.35 It further classifies the opin-
ions into seven different categories: opinions of the Court, opinions
announcing judgment, concurrences, dissents, separate opinions,
36
statements, and opinions authored as circuit justices.
3. The index identified 2,117 non-unanimous cases that the Su-
preme Court's Case Citation Finder listed for our time period. For
each of these non-unanimous cases, we turned to LEXIS's on-line
database37 to identify specific Justices joining each concurrence,
dissent, statement, or separate opinion. To ensure accuracy we
hired eighteen student research assistants to double enter the voting
coalitions. We assigned each case to two students via a random as-
signment algorithm. The students did not know which other stu-
dent received the same case.
We instructed the students to read each case in LEXIS and code
the votes in machine-readable form. We wrote code in
MATLAB to compare coding across students and flag cases in
which the coding disagreed. Cases with disagreement were for-
warded to a third student. If this student's coding agreed with one
of the original two, the coding was accepted. If the votes remained
unclear, one of the authors of this Article read the case and coded
votes accordingly.
4. For all opinions announcing judgment or majority opinions (in-
cluding those in unanimous cases), we coded voting coalitions by
listing all Justices currently on the Court who had not joined or au-
thored another opinion.
We drew information about the president and the Senate at the time of
nomination from the U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database. 39 This database
34. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17.
35. Id at xvii-xxiii.
36. Id. at xviii-xxii. A separate opinion "express[es] the view of a single Justice"
and includes opinions "concurring in part and dissenting in part." Id. at xx. In a
statement, a Justice publishes his views by issuing a short statement "in the third
person," rather than a traditional concurring or dissenting opinion written in the first
person. Id. at xiii-xiv.
37. We used the following LexisNexis database: United States Supreme Court
Cases, Lawyers' Edition.
38. MATLAB is a statistical software and programming language.
39. Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason
Roberts, U.S. SUPREME CT. JUSTICES DATABASE (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://ep
2011] I1007
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documents (1) the name of the nominating president, (2) the political party
affiliation of the nominating president, and (3) the dominant political party of
the U.S. Senate at the time of nomination. 40 For all Justices who were nomi-
nated to Chief Justice at the time they were sitting as an Associate Justice, we
use data reflecting the Justice's initial appointment to the Court.4 1
Readers interested in a detailed description of our data collection pro-
cess should consult the Appendix.
A. Our Data Set Compares Directly to a Well-Defined Subset of the
U.S. Supreme Court Database
The 18,812 decisions we code represent a substantial body of the
Court's work - and also one most likely to reveal philosophical divides be-
tween Justices. Our data compare directly to a clearly-defined subset of cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court Database. Like our data set, the Supreme Court
Database reports voting records arranged by case citation.42 The Supreme
Court Database covers all "full opinion cases" as well as all per curiam opin-
ions for cases in which the Court held an oral argument or provided a sum-
mary or opinion explaining its reasoning.43
stein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html [hereinafter THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES DATABASE].
40. Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson & Jason
Roberts, Codebook: U.S. Supreme Ct. Justices Database, U.S. SUPREME CT. JUSTICES
DATABASE 95-96 (2010), available at http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.pdf
(explaining variables 207, 208, and 212). Some contemporary studies measure the
Senate's influence by looking to the '"filibuster pivot' (or the sixtieth most liberal or
conservative senator)" rather than the median senator. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson
& Jason Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nomina-
tions, 32 CONGRESS AND PRESIDENCY 31 (2005). This is not an appropriate measure
for most of our time period. First, the Senate did not have a cloture rule allowing a
super majority to end debate until 1917. See Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE,
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster Cloture.htm (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011). Moreover, the filibuster was never used to block a Supreme
Court appointment until Abe Fortas was nominated for Chief Justice in 1968.
EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 23, at 24.
41. We provide separate data for each nomination of Charles Evans Hughes, who
served as an Associate Justice but then left to run for president in 1916. 3 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 448-49 (1922). Hughes
was later appointed Chief Justice in 1930. Supreme Court Nominations, Present-
1789, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nomi
nations.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
42. See SUPREME COURT DATABASE, supra note 14.
43. HAROLD SPAETH ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODEBOOK: RELEASE
01, at 59 (2011), available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=2 [hereinaf-
ter CODEBOOK] (explaining variable 43 - decisionType"). Our historical dataset may
cover a slightly broader range of per curiam decisions. See infra Appendix. Because
1008 [Vol. 76
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These similarities allow us to link our historical measure of the presi-
dent's appointment power to contemporary voting records in the U.S. Su-
preme Court database."
B. Our Measure ofAgreement Based on Count Data Captures Much of
the Information Reflected in Martin-Quinn Scores
Our measure of voting behavior is straightforward and time-honored.45
We count (a) the total number of times Justices agreed and (b) the total num-
ber of opportunities these Justices had to agree. Here, Justices agree when
they both vote for the majority or minority on a judgment. Thus, we employ
a simple formula to calculate percentage of agreements: percentage of agree-
ment = (a) number of times Justices agreed / (b) number of opportunities to
agree. This percentage allows us to see who votes together and at what rate.
For purposes of our inquiry, we also can compare the percentage of times a
Justice agrees with appointees of the same president or party to percentages
of agreement with appointees of a different president or party.
To measure percentages of agreement between the Justices, we consider
each opportunity two Justices had to agree in a particular case. In a case de-
cided by nine Justices, there are thirty-six total opportunities to agree. To
illustrate this point, Figure I below shows how votes are counted for the
landmark First Amendment case, Abrams v. United States.46 The decision
split 7-2 with Justices Clarke, White, Pitney, Day, Van Devanter, McReyn-
olds, and McKenna voting to affirm and Justices Holmes and Brandeis dis-
-47
senting.
any additional decisions of this sort are almost certain to be unanimous, they will not
affect our study of non-unanimous decisions.
44. Although contemporary records were very recently expanded to include
decisions through 1946, this paper relies on an earlier version of the U.S. Supreme
Court Database containing decisions in cases through 1953.
45. See C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 890, 894 (1941); see also
GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 97 (1965); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is
Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133,
163-64 (2009) (discussing Pritchett study); Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The Impact of
Presidential Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive Voting
with Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES. Q. 795, 797 (2000) ("bloc-formation analysis
has enjoyed a long and noble history in the study of judicial politics").
46. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
47. Id. Although the issue is not present in this case, we count Justices joining a
majority, plurality, or concurring opinion as part of the majority coalition and Justices
joining a dissent as part of the minority coalition.
2011] I009
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Figure 1:
Agreement Matrix
Abrams v. United States
lute, Pitny Day Mcwenn Vavo -er Hot!res Coire Badis MRyod Whirr




Opportunity to agree with same party =9/16
Opportuniy to agree with differet pany
Here Justice Clarke agreed with his own party two out of three opportu-
nities (67%) and with the other party four out of five opportunities (80%). By
counting agreements between different pairs of Justices, we can calculate the
percentage of times they vote with different groups of appointees in all cases.
The percentage of agreement for the entire group of non-unanimous cas-
es shows whether appointees of certain presidents or parties are more like-
minded than others. Of course, this percentage alone does not demonstrate
presidential success, as a president could be disappointed in the similar voting
records of all his appointees. This concern vanishes when voting records are
viewed in context, as we do in Parts III and IV, below. The literature rarely
asserts that a president has failed to appoint ideologically compatible Justices
in every case. And failure never extends to Justices of an entire party.4 8
Our voting analysis captures much of the information reflected in a lead-
ing measure of judicial ideology, Martin-Quinn scores.49 Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn use observable agreement data - votes for a majority or minori-
ty on the judgment - to fit a parametric model.5 The model maps Justices'
voting behavior to a set of numbers, or "ideal points," that can be arranged on
52the real line from closest to farthest apart. Justices who vote together fre-
48. Even Hoover's Republican appointees, whom Terri Peretti claims failed
Hoover as a group, still sat with some of Harding's Republican appointees, whom
Peretti labels a success. PERETTl, supra note 22, at 114 n.261.
49. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation
via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL.
ANALYSIS 134 (2002); see generally Fischman & Law, supra note 45, at 185; Carolyn
Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law Politics and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75
Mo. L. REv. 79, 112 (2010).
50. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 49, at 137 n.3.
51. See id, at 147.
52. See id. at 147-51.
1010 [Vol. 76
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss4/2
MA VERICKS, MODERATES, OR DRIFTERS?
quently (such as Scalia and Thomas) are close together on the line. Justices
who seldom vote together (such as Breyer and Thomas) are farther apart. As
Ward Farnsworth explains:
The [Martin-Quinn] model studies all the cases it is fed - all the
patterns of voting, all the coalitions in the cases as just described -
and then assigns a number to each Justice. You can plug those
numbers into a formula and ask the formula to generate the votes
you would expect the numbers to produce.53
Figure 2 below compares our measures of agreement and the Martin-Quinn
distance between Justices in 2009:
Figure 2:
2009 MQ-scores and Rates ofAgreement
Stevens Breyer Ginsburg Sotomayor Kennedy Roberts Auto Scalia Thomas




Sotomayor .8000 .8429 RS92
Kennedy .63 . .7368 .7000
Roberts .5789 .579 .7143 .6901 .8421
Alito .5270 .6216 .6 .S942 .810B .80
Scalia .519 .5658 S974 .6197 .T63 .9S71 M80
Thomas 0 .5867 .6184 .57 .6933 .8289 .810 .947
= sum(agree)/sum(cases) = 6 of cases judges agreed
Justices with lower rates of agreement have Martin-Quinn scores that
are farther apart while those Justices with higher rates of agreement have
Martin-Quinn scores that are closer together.
This similarity is even more apparent when we aggregate our count data
over votes between 1937 and 2009, all years Martin-Quinn scores are availa-
ble. The Figure below plots average percentages of agreement across ranked
pairs of Justices. The pairs are ordered from closest to farthest Martin-Quinn
distance, and the average is computed from the time series. For example, the
first pair of Justices has the closest Martin-Quinn scores for a given year. In
2009, this pair was Ginsburg and Sotomayor, who agreed with each other
85.92% of the time. In 2008, Souter and Ginsburg were the closest pair and
53. Ward Farnsworth, The Uses and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess
Supreme Court Justices, With Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift,
101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1891, 1893 (2007).
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agreed with each other 81% of the time. In 2007, the closest pair was Souter
and Ginsburg, who agreed 78% of the time.
We continue computing the agreement rate for the closest pair for each
year until we reach 1937 (Brandeis and Hughes, who agreed 85% of the
time). The result is a time series of agreement rates for the pair of Justices
closest together in Martin-Quinn space. We then compute the average of the
time series and find that the closest pair agrees on average 79.6% of the time.
We repeat this computation for the second closest pair and so on until we
reach the thirty-sixth closest pair.
The average agreement rates for pairs of Justices ranked by Martin-
Quinn distance are graphed below in Figure 3. The Martin-Quinn model
predicts that Justices who lie close to each other in Martin-Quinn ideal space
should agree more. In other words, the graph of ranked pairs should decline
monotonically, or continue to move downward, over pair rankings.
Figure 3:
Average Agreement Rate of Justice Pairs Ranked by MQ-Distance
Closest (Pair 1) to Farthest (Pair 36)
0.05
0.45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 11 22 2 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
As the Figure shows, the highest aggregate percentage of agreement
aligns with the two Justices closest together in Martin-Quinn space, and these
percentages of agreement fall as Justices move farther away in Martin-Quinn
space. Not surprisingly, the Martin-Quinn scores do an excellent job of pre-
dicting relative agreement rates. Our ranking of Justices based on agreement
rate reflects the information contained in Martin-Quinn distance.
A key advantage of both our method and Martin-Quinn distance is that
each method records Justices' patterns of agreement without attempting to
1012 [Vol. 76
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pass judgment on the ideological direction of their voteS. 54 Voting records
also provide more up-to-date information about Justices' ideologies (or juris-
prudential views) than ideological proxies fixed at the time of confirmation. 5
Thus, our study improves on earlier work which uses ideologically-coded
voting records or fixed proxies to evaluate presidential success in contempo-
rary appointments. 5 We learn a great deal by looking at Justices' voting
coalitions.
Like Martin-Quinn scores, our analysis focuses on non-unanimous cas-
es. These cases provide the best measure of Justices' relative positions on
the Court.58 To be sure, in our newly-coded historical time period, Justices
may have voted unanimously due to consensual norms rather than their views
of a case.5 Even today, Justices' agreement may reflect strategic voting ra-
ther than their own attitudes. Regardless of the reasons for the outcome,
54. An objective measure of coding conservative or liberal outcomes may be an
impossible feat. See Fischman & Law, supra note 45, at 162; William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 775, 778-79 (2009); Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment "Liberal"?
Coding Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (June 15, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at www.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2787/harveymeasure
menterror.pdf).
55. Two leading ideological proxies of this sort are Segal-Cover scores, which
are based on news media's accounts of a Justice at the time of confirmation, and ap-
pointing president or party of appointing president. See Fischman & Law, supra note
45, at 170-73. Here, of course, we do not use the president as a proxy but look to
voting records to determine similarity between particular presidents' appointees.
56. Thus, we differ from past studies of the appointments power which code
Justices' behavior by coding their votes as liberal or conservative. See DAVID W.
ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 107 (1976); Ep-
stein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801 (1998). Other studies rely on Segal-Cover scores rather
than voting records. Timothy R. Johnson & Jason Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presiden-
tial Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations, 32 CONGRESS AND PRESIDENCY 31, 34
(2005); Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nomi-
nations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069,
1078 (1999).
57. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 49, at 137 n.3.
58. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Mis-
conceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 850 (2010).
59. See Fischman & Law, supra note 45, at 165.
60. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1733, 1733-34, 1743 (2003) (discussing the attitudinal model and its alterna-
tives); Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically
Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2009) (measuring whether case
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however, votes in unanimous cases contain no additional information about
the relative differences between Justices.61
Moreover, looking at all decisions would produce a large decrease in
overall agreement rates during the last part of our time period. The overall
rate of dissent started to rise in 1925 and skyrocketed to approximately 50%
by 1945.62 The rise in dissents has been attributed to changes in the Court's
workload or practices of joining opinions, and our data do not suggest a
different cause.
III. WHAT Do HISTORICAL VOTING ALIGNMENTS SHOW?
Our data record every time that two Justices sitting together agreed or
disagreed in a vote on the judgment of a non-unanimous case. We begin with
a comprehensive summary of majority and minority voting coalitions from
1838 to 2009. We then turn to individual voting records. They allow us to
assess how often presidents appoint Justices who fail to vote along party
lines. They also reveal the magnitude of Justices' ideological preferences for
or against appointees of the same president or party.
Our most surprising finding is the high percentage of Justices who fa-
vored appointees of the opposite party. Throughout our time period, this
outcome occurred just under half of the time. Control of a majority of the
Senate did not improve materially the odds of appointing Justices that sided
with fellow party appointees.
Patterns we identify in individual voting records remain stable, with the
exception of the twelve most recent appointments in our study." The magni-
tude of these Justices' ideological preferences has increased over historical
levels and reflects a more polarized Court. Thus, history shows that presi-
dents have been disappointed just under half the time, but now the stakes are
much higher. A disappointing Justice likely will vote against executive inter-
ests in a greater percentage of cases.
In the aggregate, appointees of the same president agree with one anoth-
er at a small but materially higher rate than they agree with appointees of a
different president. Justices' aggregate rates of agreement with appointees of
the same party, however, are roughly the same as rates of agreement with
appointees of another party. While most of our findings are stable over time,
we find one significant change since the 1950s: Justices nominated to the
61. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 58, at 850.
62. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45
AM. J. POL. Sci. 362, 363 & fig.1 (2001); Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines,
Institutional Disunity, the Judges' Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W.
POL. Q. 471, 476, 478-80 & figs.1-3 (1977); John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery
Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 162,
166 (1999).
63. See sources cited supra note 62.
64. Our time period does not include Justice Kagan.
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Justices agreed with fellow appointees of the same president 70% of the
time and appointees of another president 64% of the time. The spread is
much closer on a party level. Justices appointed by presidents of the same
party voted together 66% of the time while voting with appointees of the oth-
er party 64% of the time.
One might expect the numbers to tell a different story fo ices nomi-
nated during times of divided governient. If presidents are forced to nomi-
nate more moderate Justices when they face an opposing-party Senate, these
Justices might tend to vote with appointees of other presidents or parties more
frequently. Our aggregate voting statistics do not show evidence of modera-
tion. In fact, the numbers barely change.
Justices nominated to an opposing-party Senate sided with fellow ap-
pointees of their president 71% of the time and voted with appointees of the
other presidents 65% of the time. The difference between the rates of agree-
ment along party lines declined from 2% to 1% Justices appointed during
periods of divided government voted with fellow party appointees 66% of the
time and agreed with appointees of other parties 65% of the time. The aggre-
gate voting behavior of Justices nominated during periods of divided gov-
ernment is statistically indistinguishable from the behavior of Justices nomi-
nated when one party controlled the Senate and White House.
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Most of these results do not appear to change over time. From the Ei-
senhower Administration on, Justices sided with appointees of the same and
different parties at rates similar to their historical counterparts. Agreements
with appointees of the same president change, however, when the same party
as the president controls the Senate. In this circumstance, the rate that ap-
pointees of the same president vote together has increased significantly since
the 1950s.65
Aggregate records tell us only so much. The recent increase in presi-
dential success for Justices confirmed by a same-party Senate may reflect a
number of different factors. It may be that presidents have a higher rate of
success in appointing Justices who favor the president's other appointees. Or
the rate of successful appointments may remain the same while Justices that
do side with their co-appointees do so in a much higher percentage of cases.
Also, aggregate records are weighted in favor of Justices who spend a longer
time on the bench. This factor is largely beyond the president's control and
varies across time periods.
Likewise, the lack of strong party or presidential effect in our aggregate
voting records does not necessarily imply that presidents or parties are irrele-
vant. The aggregate numbers could reflect votes of many Justices who are
equally likely to agree regardless of party affiliation. Or they may reflect the
average across individual Justices with extreme voting records. Consider two
explanations for voting patterns in which Justices agree with appointees of
the same party 65% of the time. First, one might observe this rate of agree-
ment because each Justice votes with his party approximately 65% of the
time. Alternatively, one might observe this rate because two out of every
three Justices vote with their party 80% of the time, while one out of three
"switches" and votes with his party only 35% of the time. The latter explana-
tion should be much more worrisome to a president because there is a one-
third probability of making a huge mistake.
We turn to individual voting records to identify which explanation best
fits our data. The answer turns on two variables key to assessing presidential
success: (1) How often does the president appoint a Justice who switches
65. The president's greater success generally coincides with executive deploy-
ment of more extensive bureaucratic machinery to select nominees. See DAVID
ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 12-13 (1999). This phenomenon started dur-
ing the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. See id. Christine Nemacheck builds on
this analysis and argues that presidents have the ability to nominate candidates with
more extensive track records when they face a same party Senate. See NEMACHECK,
supra note 25, at 131-32. This is also consistent with Ryan Owens' and Justin Wede-
king's recent working paper finding that, in recent times, unconstrained presidents are
more successful at nominating Justices with ideological preferences that are less like-
ly to drift away from executive preference. Ryan J. Owens & Justin Wedeking, Pick-
ing an Unsettled Brain: The Role of Cognitive Complexity in Ideological Drift on the
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sides? That is, how frequently do presidents appoint Justices like Souter? (2)
What is the magnitude of each Justice's preference for one side or the other?
Has the president appointed a Justice like Thomas, who strongly aligns with
appointees of the same party, or like Kennedy, who aligns with the same par-
ty only moderately?
Table 1 compares the percentages of times each Justice voted with ap-
pointees of the same president and with appointees of a different president.
The percentages in Table 1 show that a different picture emerges when one
considers the voting patterns of individual Justices. Presidents fare better
with some appointees than others.
Table 1:
Rate ofAgreement with Appointees
of the Same and Different Presidents
Same Dliffrent Same Different
President President President Prside1nt
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My 54 016 441 P~utr 8799 62 2599
R3S31105nfr 8438 669 749
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2orr 34 7147 04obe66~rts 7279 6277 1002
5  7.3 0VCardze 65695 64 69 229
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NHwayne 69 747 O00uglas 65.24 64 0
SFr6 66699 55 FA6mphy 60R95 6
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Of the eighty-three Justices who sat with another appointee of the same
president, sixty, or just under three-quarters, voted with their co-appointees
more frequently. Only twenty-three Justices (28%) sided with appointees of
66
other presidents a greater percentage of the time. These numbers line up
well with past studies speculating that approximately 20-25% of Justices will
67
disappoint their appointing presidents. The magnitude of agreement also is
skewed toward fellow appointees. Just over one-third of the Justices (twenty-
eight out of eighty-three) voted with their fellow appointees at least 10%
more often than they voted with other appointees. Only six out of eighty-
three Justices voted with other presidents' appointees at least 10% more than
they voted with fellow appointees.
Appointees of the same party show significantly less cohesive voting
records. Table 2, below, compares the percentage of times a Justice voted
with appointees of the same party versus appointees of a different party.68
66. Interestingly, we have the opportunity to measure agreements between Chief
Justice Taft and two of the Justices he appointed when he was president: Van Devant-
er and Pitney. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-] 789, supra note 41 (listing
all Justices and the presidents who appointed them). Both voted with Taft at a high
rate: Out of all the non-unanimous cases in which Taft and Van Devanter sat together,
they agreed 95% of the time. Out of all the non-unanimous cases in which Taft and
Pitney sat together, they agreed 82% of the time. Taft voted with Van Devanter a
greater percentage of time than he voted with any other Justice.
67. Studies that attempt comprehensive analyses of presidential successes and
failures include: PERETTI, supra note 22, at 118 (indicating that presidents fail "up to
25 percent" of the time); ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 56, at 107-08 ("[L]ess than
one-fourth of the nominees of both Democratic and Republican presidents can be said
to have generally voted contrary to the appointing president's views," as measured by
liberal, moderate, or conservative voting patterns from 1909 to 1971.); SCIGLIANO,
supra note 29, at 147 ("[O]ne justice in four ... did not conform to the expectations
of his appointer.").
68. As these results are not weighted by case, some high percentages reflect
voting records for a small number of opportunities to vote with Justices appointed by
an opposing party president. See our discussion of Justice Woods infra Part III.B..
We exclude two Justices who sat only with Justices of the same party (Vinson and
Woodbury) and Benjamin Curtis, who did not sit with any other Justices appointed by
a president of the same party.
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Table 2:
Rate ofAgreement with
Appointees of Same and Different Party
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Out of the eighty-nine Justices who sat with appointees of their own and
opposing parties, forty-two (47%) voted with appointees of the opposite party
more frequently than they voted with their own party.69 This is just under
half the time. This finding is surprising and should rattle any strong expecta-
tions about the president's ability to influence the Court.
69. While this may reflect changes in party values over time, we control for this
to some extent by comparing only Justices who sit together. Democrats appointed in
1888 and 1895 (during the first and second Cleveland Administrations) are likely to
have reqin commo than they do with Democrats appointed during the Clinton
Administration.
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To be sure, many of the Justices who switch sides are more moderate
than extreme, as they do not exhibit a strong preference for the other party.
Of the forty-two Justices who side with the other party, only eight (19%) side
with appointees of the opposite party at least 10% more often than they side
with appointees of their own party. But even moderation may disappoint
voters or presidents hoping to influence the Court.70
Control of a majority of the Senate does not materially improve the odds
of appointing Justices that side with fellow party appointees. Of the sixty-
seven Justices who were nominated while the president's party controlled the
Senate, thirty-two (48%) voted with appointees of the opposite party more
frequently than they voted with their own party. Of the twenty-two Justices
nominated during divided government, ten (45%) voted with appointees of
the opposite party more frequently than they voted with their own party. The
rate at which presidents nominate a Justice who subsequently aligns more
closely with Justices of the other party remains about the same no matter
which party controls the Senate.
Our findings are difficult to square with a majoritarian Court whose pol-
icy views are updated by new appointments. The fact that a high percentage
of Justices prefer to vote with appointees of the other party - even when nom-
inated to a same-party Senate - casts doubt on the hypothesis that appoint-
ments bring the Court in line with dominant political views.
Most of the individual findings discussed above remain constant over
time. Presidents have had about the same rates of success in appointing Jus-
tices who will agree with others of the same administration or party. The
significant change is the magnitude of individual Justices' preferences for
joining appointees of the same or other party. When we compare historical
voting alignments to those starting with the Supreme Court Database in 1953,
alignments become more polarized near the end of the twentieth century. Ten
of the past twelve Justices have at least a 10% spread between rates of agree-
ment with appointees of the same and other party. In other words, very recent
appointees either vote strongly with appointees of the same party or strongly
with appointees of the other party. In the 133 years before Rehnquist's ini-
tial appointment, only twenty of the seventy-seven appointees (26%) voted
strongly one way or another.
Also, of these last twelve Justices, only two (Souter and Stevens) have
aligned most often with appointees of another party. This low number might
lead one to question whether the frequency of presidential disappointments
also has diminished recently. Given that presidents missed in only two out of
the last twelve appointments, this frequency is unlikely to remain as high as it
was in the past. Based on this small sample of Justices, however, it is too
70. The magnitude of agreement is more pronounced for Justices who agree with
other appointees of the same party. Of the forty-seven Justices who voted with their
fellow party appointees more often, twenty-two (47%) joined Justices of their party at
least ten percent more often than they joined Justices of a different party.
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soon to state confidently that disappointments are now occurring at a dramat-
ically lower rate. We are eager to see if this pattern continues in future ap-
pointees, and, if so, how great the change turns out to be.
Presidential success or failure demonstrated by the Justices' overall vot-
ing records is now likely to be more pronounced, but presidents have not seen
great improvement in their odds of appointing an ideologically compatible
Justice. Throughout history, Justices have favored appointees of the opposite
party just under half of the time. An opposing party Senate has no effect on
this outcome. History provides ample reason to question whether appoint-
ments bring the Court into line with majoritarian views. Voters should think
twice before assuming that control of the White House or Senate will allow
them to influence the overall voting records of the Court.
IV. MAVERICKS, MODERATES, OR DRIFTERS
Although historical voting records reveal a remarkable level of judicial
independence, they also reflect conventional wisdom about particular appoin-
tees thought to have disappointed executive expectations. It should come as
no surprise that the following Justices sided with appointees of other presi-
dents or parties: McLean, Wayne, Holmes, McReynolds, Reed, Frankfurter,
Clark, Warren, Brennan, Stevens, and Souter.71 While the list also excludes
others whom we might expect to see, such as Justices Chase, Day, and
Blackmun, looking to agreement with appointees of the same president or
party is only one measure of success. This measure does not address wheth-
er a decision was salient to the president. What is missing historically, how-
ever, is the ability to compare anecdotes to overall voting records.
Our voting records suggest three lines of historical inquiry. First, what
do the data tell us about leading anecdotes of presidential disappointment?
Second, when viewed in light of individual voting records, how significant is
the moderating effect of an opposing-party Senate? Last, because disappoint-
ed presidential expectations are often studied as problems of ideological drift,
how do voting records change over time? Our data double the current num-
ber of years considered in studies of drift. They allow for a preliminary
measure of whether historical voting patterns also provide evidence of drift.
A. Disappointed Presidents
To view Justices' performance through the lens of an appointing presi-
dent, we begin with a bar chart listing every president with two or more ap-
pointees and the overall percentage of times these appointees voted together.
71. See supra Tables 1-2.
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Presidents with the lowest rates of agreement have well-documented in-
stances of disappointment or success in one but not all appointees: Woodrow
Wilson (44%) and George H.W. Bush (52%).72 Presidents near the top of the
list, George W. Bush (87%) and Warren Harding (86%), are thought to have
succeeded in all appointments to the Court.
Overall levels of agreement shed little light on debates about Abraham
Lincoln's and Theodore Roosevelt's appointees. Take Roosevelt: the con-
ventional wisdom is that he regretted appointing William Day but was de-
lighted to have appointed William Moody.73 He complained vociferously
about Oliver Wendell Holmes' ruling in Northern Securities, an antitrust case
of great "political excitement" in which "Republican and Democratic Judges
united in both the majority and the minority opinions."7 Still, scholars de-
bate whether Roosevelt had grounds for complaining based on Holmes' over-
all record.75
72. See PERETTI, supra note 22, at 114 n.261 (identifying Thomas, Brandeis, and
Clarke as successes and McReynolds as a clear disappointment).
73. See id.; SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 135-36.
74. See SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 135; 3 WARREN, supra note 41, at 444.
75. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 128; SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 135.
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Lincoln presents a similar problem, as scholars offer different accounts
of how he fared. Did Lincoln get "from his five justices what he wanted
when he needed it,"76 or did all but Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase meet ex-
pectations? 77 Again this assessment should reflect whether Chase disappoint-
ed Lincoln in only key cases or in his overall voting records.
We address these questions by constructing a more detailed measure of
the individual voting records of Justices who sat with at least two other ap-
pointees of the same president. Table 3, below, shows a Justice's marginal
effect on rates of agreement. We define a Justice's marginal effect as the
percentage increase or decrease in agreement that would occur if a particular
Justice were not sitting with a president's other appointees.
For example, President Wilson appointed three Justices - James
78
McReynolds, Louis Brandeis, and John Clarke. They sat together and had
627 opportunities to agree, of which they agreed 277 times (44.2%). Obvi-
ously, President Wilson did not do a good job of selecting Justices with simi-
lar ideologies.
But why is the agreement rate so low? Two explanations come to mind.
Perhaps all three Justices are far apart from each other in ideological space;
therefore, the agreement rate between any pair will be low. If this is the case,
President Wilson could have matched no more than one of the three Justices
to his preferred ideology since, by definition, two of the three Justices are
always far away from any single Justice.
Alternatively, President Wilson may have selected two Justices close to
his preferred ideology but failed on a third Justice. This possibility is still
consistent with a low overall rate of agreement. For this explanation, howev-
er, individual rates of agreement should follow a different pattern. They
should reveal two Justices who agree with each other at a high rate while
agreeing with a third Justice at a low rate. By computing the marginal effect
for each of President Wilson's appointees, we can identify which of these
explanations is likely to generate the low overall agreement rate.
Recall that the marginal effect is defined as the percentage increase or
decrease in agreement that would occur if a particular Justice were not sitting
with the president's other appointees. The set of Wilson appointees agreed
44.2% of the time. If we exclude Justice McReynolds and compare the
agreement of the remaining Wilson appointees we find the following: Justic-
es Brandeis and Clarke had 106 opportunities to agree with each other, and
they did agree seventy-one times (67%). Adding Justice McReynolds to the
set of Wilson Justices decreases the overall level of agreement by 23% (from
67% in the absence of McReynolds to 44% with all Justices included). We
therefore conclude that Justice McReynolds has a marginal effect of -23%.
76. SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 131.
77. See PERETri, supra note 22, at 114 n.261.
78. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-i 789, supra note 41.
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We compute the marginal effect in this manner for every Justice who sat
with at least two other Justices appointed by the same president. By compar-
ing the marginal effects, we can identify whether diverse views of a single
Justice or an entire group of appointees cause the low rates of agreement.
Table 3:
Marginal Rates ofAgreement
President Justice MAR President Justice MAR
Jackson JMcLean -0.02 Harding WHTaft -0.99
Jackson HBoldwin -0.59 Harding GSutherland -0.13
Jackson iMWayne 4.8 Harding PButler 3
Jackson RBTaney 2.22 Harding ETSanford -1.01
Jackson PPBarbour -0.04 Hoover CEHughes2 7.26
Jackson iCatron -5.19 Hoover OiRoberts 3.26
Lincoln NHSwayne 0.95 Hoover BNCardozo -10.71
Lincoln SFMiller -0.82 FOR HLBlack 1-84
Lincoln ODavis 0.61 FOR SFReed -0.14
Lincoln SIField -1.76 FDR FFrankfurter -4.29
Lincoln SPChase 0.49 FOR WODouglas -0.38
Grant WStrong -1.2 FDR FMurphy 1.01
Grant JPfIradley -4.41 FDR JFByrnes 0.11
Grant WHunt 2.47 FOR RHackson 0.18
Grant MRWaite 2.89 FOR WBRutledge 1-17
Cleveland LQLamar 1.86 Truman HHBurton -0.04
Cleveland MWFuller 2.58 Truman FMVinson 0.77
Harrison DiBrewer 3.35 Truman TCClark -2
Harrison HfBrown -3.55 Truman SMinton -0.32
Harrison GShiras 039 Eisenhower EWarren 0.56
Harrison HElackson -0.16 Eisenhower JHarIan2 -417
Cleveland EDEWhite -8.37 Eisenhower WiBrennon 2.62
Cleveland RWPeckham 1.56 Eisenhower CEWhittaker -0.18
TRoosevelt OWHolmes -1.23 Eisenhower PStewart 1.83
T Roosevelt WRDay -4.2 Nixon WEBurger 5.48
TRoosevelt WHMoody 0.96 Nixon HABlackmun -6-57
Taft HHLurton 1.14 Nixon LFPowell 2.36
Taft CEHughes1 -0.65 Nixon WHRehnquist -2.51
Taft WVan Devanter 4.86 Reagan SDOConnor -0.51
Taft JRLamar 0 Reagan AScalia -2.22




Combined with information on Justices' voting alignments and appoin-
tees overall rates of agreement, marginal rates of agreement add new insights
for Theodore Roosevelt's, Abraham Lincoln's, and Woodrow Wilson's ap-
pointees.
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1. Theodore Roosevelt
Results for Theodore Roosevelt's appointees are interesting and unex-
pected. His appointees' overall rate of agreement, 68%, places him in the
bottom third of all presidents with two or more appointees. One might expect
this low rate of agreement is attributed to individual voting patterns consistent
with his purported views of the Justices. That is, Day would vote with non-
Roosevelt appointees and Democrats more frequently than Moody. Holmes
would align with one or the other in a way that would make clear whether he
met Roosevelt's expectations or not.
But voting data for individual Justices show no clear patterns along the-
se lines.
Figure 6:
Justices Appointed by Theodore Roosevelt
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Day was the only one of the three to side with non-Roosevelt appointees
more often than not, but he also was the only one to favor fellow Republican
appointees. Holmes and Moody agreed with Democrats more frequently than
Republicans. These results are mixed, and overall voting records do not show
that Roosevelt got what he wanted from Moody but not Day. While Holmes
aligned with Moody, he did so by crossing party lines at a higher frequency.
This mixed voting record should not count as a success.
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Moreover, marginal rates of agreement do not reveal a strong division of
opinion among the three. Holmes and Day agreed 67% of the time, Holmes
and Moody agreed 72% of the time, and Day and Moody agreed 69% of the
time. Justice Day shows the greatest marginal effect but at the low rate of
-4%. Holmes is just shy of Day with a marginal effect of -1%.
Despite Roosevelt's different views of these Justices, their voting behav-
ior is remarkably similar. Roosevelt had very little to complain about regard-
ing Holmes or Day as compared to Justice Moody.79 Their marginal effects
on rates of agreement were close to zero. This low marginal effect shows that
none made much difference in overall rates of agreement. The data suggest
Roosevelt's expressed disappointment with Holmes and Day should be at-
tributed to their rulings in particular cases such as Northern Securities (for
Holmes)80 and Hammer v. Dagenhart (for Day).81
2. Abraham Lincoln
Marginal rates of agreement illuminate Justice Chase's performance rel-
ative to other Lincoln appointees. Did Chase generally side with favorable
rulings made by Lincoln's other appointees and disappoint in only key deci-
sions involving the Legal Tender Acts? Or did Chase disagree with other
Lincoln appointees in a large number of cases?
Chase played two prominent roles in the Legal Tender Acts. These Acts
made paper currency legal tender and were "the fiscal keystone of Lincoln's
Administration." 82 As Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury, Chase helped
83draft the Legal Tender Acts. Indeed, Chase placed his own portrait on one-
dollar bills that these Acts authorized.84 Lincoln appointed Chase to the
Court "in large part because of his presumed reliability on the legal tender
issue."85 Lincoln expressed his desire for an appointee who would "sustain
what has been done with regard to . . . the legal tenders," and thought that
Chase's "known" opinions on this issue were a reason in favor of his ap-
79. See SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 135-36.
80. Id.
81. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1916) (striking down Child Labor
Law of 1916), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); R. Fried-
man, supra note 21, at 1299.
82. R. Friedman, supra note 21, at 1297.
8 3. Id.
84. See Stephen L. Goldsmith, Symbols on American Money, FED. RES. BANK OF
PHILA., 4, available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/economic-educ
ation/symbols-on-american-money.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) ("The $1 legal
tender note, issued by the United States during the Civil War, was the first widely
circulated U.S. $1 bill .... It features Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.")
85. R. Friedman, supra note 21, at 1297.
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pointment. Once on the bench, however, Chief Justice Chase voted contra-
ry to Lincoln's interests. He joined a 4-3 majority invalidating the Legal
Tender Acts.87
Beyond issues of monetary policy, Lincoln's appointees confronted fun-
damental questions of executive power in times of war. They ruled favorably
on some leading disputes, such as the Prize Cases,88 during the war. In later
years and after Lincoln's death, they refused to sanction some of his wartime
policies in cases such as Exparte Milligan.8 9
Overall, Lincoln's appointees found less to agree about than other presi-
dents' appointees. Their general rate of agreement, 68%, put them in the
bottom third of our ranking. One explanation might be that Chase voted at
odds with other Lincoln appointees Field, Davis, Miller, and Swayne, giving
credence to the view that Chase alone let down Lincoln.90 However, individ-
ual voting records do not support this view.
86. 3 WARREN, supra note 41, at 123. Lincoln's main reservation about the
nomination focused on Chase's presidential ambitions. Id. at 122-23.
87. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869), overruled in part by The Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
88. 67 U.S. 635, 659 (1863); ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 96.
89. 71 U.S. 2, 129-31 (1866) (holding unlawful, military commissions that were
authorized by the president in areas where Article III courts were open and function-
ing).
90. See PERETrI, supra note 22, at 114 n.261.
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Figure 7: Justices Appointed by Abraham Lincoln
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Chase's marginal effect on the overall rate of agreement was zero. He
voted with Lincoln's party and Republican appointees more often than not.
Swayne was the only one to materially side with Lincoln appointees less fre-
quently than with appointees of other presidents, and Davis and Field were
the only two to break rank on party. Chase agreed with Swayne 72% of the
time, Miller 65% of the time, Davis 66% of the time, and Field 74% of the
time. Their overall rates of agreeability (from 72-64%) put them in the aver-
age range for this measure. While Chase may have let Lincoln down in cases
involving the Legal Tender Acts, Chase's general pattern of voting did not
stray far from that of Lincoln's other appointees.
3. Woodrow Wilson
We end with Wilson because his appointees present the most striking
example of failure in terms of overall voting records.
Figure 9:
Justices Appointed by Woodrow Wilson
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All of Wilson's appointees voted with appointees of other parties more
often than not. Justice McReynolds' marginal effect adds much to our under-
standing of the low rate of overall agreement for his appointees. McReynolds'
marginal effect, -23%, dwarfs the absolute marginal effects of all other Jus-
tices. It is almost double the absolute value of the closest marginal effect,
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-11% by Justice Cardozo. As a whole, Wilson's appointees voted together
only 44% of the time. Again, this low rate reflects a strong division of opin-
ion between McReynolds and his fellow appointees. McReynolds agreed
with Brandeis only 40% of the time and Clarke only 38% of the time, while
Clarke and Brandeis voted together 67% of the time. McReynolds provides
strong evidence of a Justice whose overall record gives a president much
ground for disappointment.
McReynolds' performance may not have been a complete surprise to
Wilson, however. McReynolds had been an attorney general in the Taft ad-
ministration before he broke ranks to campaign for Wilson.91 Wilson ap-
92pointed him as his Attorney General. In that role, McReynolds built a
strong record as a trust-buster, and Wilson had some reason to believe
McReynolds shared his Progressive views. Wilson "assumed [McReynolds]
would be a liberal generally because he was a liberal in anti-trust policy." 93
Others, however, have attributed the appointment to Wilson's desire to get rid
of McReynolds. 94 Even if McReynolds "was impossible to live with, Wilson
rationalized, that did not mean he was not politically progressive."95 The
divisive voting pattern between McReynolds and Brandeis probably reflects
personal animosity as well. McReynolds was an anti-Semite who refused to
talk to Brandeis for three years after his appointment. 96
Given McReynolds' background, one might expect him to be the least
agreeable Justice, in terms of his overall rate of agreement with all Justices
with whom he sat. In fact, this dubious distinction goes to Clarke. His aver-
age rate of agreement with all other Justices was only 52%. Henry Abraham
recounts that he was "unhappy on the Court" and resigned after only six years
of service. 97 Abraham attributes Clarke's resignation to disillusionment with
the Court's "failure to embrace a genuinely liberal approach to public policy,"
as well as a "gentle" personality that could not cope with McReynolds' "an-
tics and hostilities."98
Our data provide a more complete picture of disappointing votes cast by
Justices Chase and Holmes. Neither Lincoln nor Roosevelt had reason to
single them out based on their overall voting behavior. These disappoint-
ments stem from votes in a few important cases, yet another way that Justices
91. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 139.
92. Id.
93. SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 157.
94. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 139.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 140.
97. Id. at 145.
98. Id. at 145.
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can fall short of executive expectations.99 Other times, as was the case with
President Wilson, an appointee's overall voting record falls short of expecta-
tions.'0 0
B. Divided Government and Moderation
Justices nominated when the president faces an opposing-party Senate
do not show significantly more moderate aggregate voting patterns.' 0' Nor
does divided government make these appointees any more likely to side with
appointees of the other party. Our discussion below provides a more detailed
examination of Justices nominated in times of divided government during the
heretofore unexamined nineteenth century. Once again, we do not find strong
evidence of a moderating Senate effect.
1. Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur Administrations
Republican President Rutherford B. Hayes' nomination of William
Woods marks the beginning of a series of appointments made during divided
government.102 Hayes appointed two Justices, John Marshall Harlan and
Woods.103 The Republicans controlled the Senate when he nominated Har-
lan, but Democrats controlled the Senate when Hayes nominated Woods.1
Harlan and Woods agreed 70% of the time, placing Hayes near the middle
range on this statistic.
In the next three appointments after Woods, Republican presidents faced
a Democratic or evenly divided Senate. President James A. Garfield nomi-
nated Stanley Matthews to an opposing-party Senate, and President Chester
A. Arthur nominated Horace Gray and Samuel Blatchford to an evenly divid-
ed Senate.'os Woods, Matthews, Gray, and Blatchford all voted with Demo-
cratic appointees at a higher rate than Republican appointees.
99. See supra notes 80, 87 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Tables 1-2.
102. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, supra note 41.
103. See id.
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Figure 10:
Justices Appointed by Presidents Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur
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Still, it is hard to draw a strong conclusion of moderation here. Woods'
and Matthews' records should be discounted as they had only limited oppor-
tunities to agree with a Democratic appointee (seven for Woods and twenty-
two for Matthews). 106 Gray barely voted across party lines, leaving Blatch-
ford as the only Justice to agree with Democratic appointees at the relatively
high rate of 87%. Rates of agreement between Justices Harlan through
Blatchford also carry little information. Rates of agreement between Woods,
Matthews, Gray, and Blatchford all hovered around the 80% range. While
Harlan agreed with all four at a consistently lower rate (70-50%), Harlan
agreed with all Justices only 57% of the time.
2. Cleveland Administrations
Democratic President Grover Cleveland had the chance to appoint four
Justices during his two non-consecutive terms of office. He nominated Jus-
tices Lucius Q.C. Lamar, Melville Fuller, and Rufus Peckham to a Republi-
can-controlled Senate.107 Justice Edward White was his only appointee nom-
inated to a Democratic Senate. The overall rate of agreement for Cleve-
land's appointees was 70%, and the general consensus is that Cleveland suc-
ceeded in these appointments to the Court.109 Still, one wonders whether the
Republican Senate led Cleveland to nominate more moderate Justices than
when Democrats were in control.
106. This was because their Court was dominated by Republican appointees.
Woods overlapped with only one Democratic appointee, Clifford, for a few months in
1881. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, supra note 41. Likewise,
Matthews overlapped with only Clifford and Lamar for short periods of time. See id.
107. See THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES DATABASE, supra note 39.
108. Id.
109. PERETTI, supra note 22, at 114 n.261.
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Our results fail to support this hypothesis for Cleveland. Of his four ap-
pointees, White was the only one to agree with appointees of other presidents
or parties at a higher rate (65%/66% for presidents and 64%/66% for party).
Indeed, he went on to secure Republican President Taft's nomination for
Chief Justice. 110 President and party splits for Lamar, Fuller, and Peckham
showed that they favored with Justices appointed by Cleveland or Democrats.
With splits of 91%/72%, Lamar was near the top of the range for agreements
with appointees of the same president and party. Fuller and Peckham were
just above average in this dimension. (Fuller's votes split 71%/68% for both
presidents and party, and Peckham's votes split 71%/66% for both presidents
and party.) These results are the opposite of what one would expect if the
Senate had a moderating influence. All Justices' rates of agreement with all
other Justices were in the average range of 66 to 74%.
Inter-Justice and marginal agreement rates confirm White's distinctive
voting pattern. He agreed with Fuller and Peckham only 63 and 67% of the
time (and did not sit with Lamar). These rates are the lowest percentages of
agreement for all pairs of Cleveland appointees. Rates of marginal effect for
110. 3 WARREN, supra note 41, at 442-43.
MM~f-ir IEE IM
Ma-00Oafffl N - - HB
I
36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss4/2
MA VERICKS, MODERATES, OR DRIFTERS?
Justices Lamar, Fuller, and Peckham fall between 1-3%."' Justice White,
however, depressed the overall rate of agreement among Cleveland appoin-
tees at a marginal rate of -8%. Excluding White, the other Justices would
have had a high overall agreement rate of 78%.
Despite this voting record, the lack of any clear Senate effect should be
considered in context. Historically, the Senate's confirmation decisions may
have turned on political concerns other than judicial ideology.112 And alt-
hough Democrats controlled the Senate when Cleveland nominated White,
they did not have a large margin over Republicans.11 3 White's nomination
followed on the heels of two failed nominations, so that "Cleveland was anx-
ious to find someone whom the Senate would approve."', 14 Likewise, Repub-
licans did not have large margins over Democrats when the Senate confirmed
Lamar, Fuller, and Peckham. 115 Thus, Cleveland may not have tended to-
ward moderation in those cases. The Senate's effect in this case seems more
closely tied to close margins and refusals to confirm two of Cleveland's nom-
inees.
s* ***
By extending Justices' voting records back another hundred years, we
see a more complete picture of how divided government affects the presi-
dent's appointments power. Our historical study shows that control of the
Senate has mattered little, at least in terms of its ability to alter the odds that
an appointee will vote across party lines once on the bench. Furthermore, the
Senate's lack of influence over Justices who are confirmed is stable across
time.
The Senate's inability to enhance its role is curious in light of the fact
that confirmation procedures have changed dramatically. David Stras has
provided a detailed account of changes that started in the twentieth century
and are thought to have politicized the Senate's confirmation process."16 For
111. Lamar sat with only Fuller. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-i 789,
supra note 41.
112. See Whittington, supra note 20, at 436.
113. There were only 44 Democrats, compared to 40 Republicans and four Sena-
tors of other parties. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, supra note 41;
see also Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.sen
ate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_itemand teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2011) (listing the party make-up of the Senate).
114. SCIGLIANO, supra note 29, at 158.
115. When Lamar and Fuller were appointed in 1888, Democrats held 37 seats
and Republicans held 39 seats. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, supra
note 113. When Peckham was appointed in 1895, Democrats held 40 seats to Repub-
licans' 44 seats and other parties' six seats. Id.
116. See generally David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial
Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (2008).
2011] I035
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example, the early divided government appointments we study precede the
Seventeenth Amendment (1913), as well as requirements of roll call voting,
opening "all sessions on the debate of a judicial nominee to the public," and
requesting "that nominees personally appear before the Senate Judiciary
Committee."I 17
Whatever the effect of these heightened Senate procedures in other are-
as, our data do not show evidence that these procedures increased the odds of
an opposing party obtaining a moderate Justice. The Senate's failure to gain
influence leaves interesting questions for future research. Have the odds
stayed the same because the Senate's modem procedures are more window
dressing than substance? Or have both the Senate and the president become
more powerful in their ability to influence appointees' ideology?
Modem presidents have the benefit of far more sophisticated bureaucrat-
ic machinery with which to inform their choice of Justice." 8 When they face
a same party Senate, they now appoint Justices who vote with their other
appointees at significantly higher rates in the aggregate." The Senate may
be playing a more powerful role by keeping rates of agreement to normal
levels in times of divided government.
C. Ideological Drift
Leading contemporary studies argue that ideological drift can be a fre-
quent source of votes contrary to executive expectations.120 Drift might oc-
cur, for example, when a Justice's initial voting record meets executive ex-
pectations but then deteriorates in later years. Justice Blackmun's voting
records provide a good example of this phenomenon.121 Thus, as Lee Epstein
and her co-authors assert, while presidents can be "reasonably certain" of
how Justices will vote during their first terms in office, "most Justices fluctu-
ate" in their voting patterns "before hitting the first-decade mark."l 22 Ideo-
logical drift means that presidents "cannot guarantee the 'entrenchment' of
their ideology on the Court in the long, or even medium, term."1 23 A recent
working paper attributes the propensity to drift to an opposing-party Senate:
if an opposing Senate forces the president to nominate a "stealth" candidate
with a short paper trail, that Justice may be more likely to drift once on the
Court. 124
117. Id. at 1058-62.
118. See supra note 65.
119. See supra Figure 4.
120. See, e.g., Drift, supra note 16, at 1486-87.
121. Id. at 1494.
122. Id. at 1486.
123. Id.
124. Owens & Wedeking, supra note 65, at 20.
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The statistics we present above cannot be used to draw inferences about
the possibility of drift. In almost all cases we report votes cast during a Jus-
tice's entire time on the bench. Aggregate agreement rates cannot be used to
differentiate between a constant rate of agreement (no drift) or satisfactory
votes early on and disappointing ones later (drift). Still, we wonder whether
disappointing votes occur early on, consistently throughout a Justice's career,
or only after many years on the bench. Our voting records can be used to
construct a measure of one of the empirical implications of drift, and our new
records go back far enough to more than double the current voting data
brought to bear on this question.
We extend our analysis to offer a measure of how voting patterns in our
dataset evolve. The measure we construct is based on the insight that, in the
presence of drift, if a president chooses Justices with similar location in ideo-
logical space, agreement rates with groups of appointees should decline over
time.
Consider the Martin-Quinn score. If a president always can appoint Jus-
tices with a Martin-Quinn score reflecting his own preferences, the Justices
are likely to exhibit a high rate of agreement with each other. Drift can be
modeled as a random walk in Martin-Quinn scores where the score at time
t+1 is equal to the score at time t plus a mean zero random independent and
identically distributed shock.125 Under the hypothesis of no drift, the random
shock is set to zero and the Martin-Quinn scores are constant. Under the al-
ternative hypothesis of drift, the random shock is mean zero with positive
variance, and, as time evolves, the Justices almost surely drift apart in Martin-
Quinn space. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of no drift, the Justices the
same president appoints are likely to agree with each other at a high rate and
the rate of agreement should not change over time. Under the alternative
hypothesis of drift, the agreement rates should start off high and then decline
as the Justices drift apart.
To test this hypothesis, we compute the time series of agreement rates
for each presidential group and then average across groups. Specifically, we
identify each president who had more than one appointee sit together. We
define year one to be the first year the president's appointees sat together and
year two to be the second year they sat together. We continue in this manner
until we exhaust voting records for cases where at least two appointees of the
same president remain on the bench.
President Richard Nixon's appointees provide a helpful example. Here,
year one is 1970 - the first year Justice Burger had the opportunity to vote
125. The random walk is a common statistical model of the path of an object that
is equally likely to move in any direction. It derives, literally, from a study of a ran-
dom or "drunkard's" walk in the 1905 edition of Nature. See Karl Pearson, The Prob-
lem of the Random Walk, 72 NATURE 294, 318, 342 (1905), available at http://
www.nature.com/physics/looking-back/pearson/index.html. Today, the random walk
has been widely adopted by the physical and social sciences and is routinely used to
model drift in biology, physics, economics and political science.
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with a second Nixon appointee (Justice Blackmun). 126 In year two, 1971, we
continue with records for Burger and Blackmun and also add records for new
appointees, Powell and Rehnquist.127 We proceed with records for these four
through Burger's retirement in 1986.128 We then keep calculating agreements
between remaining Nixon appointees (Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) in
the same fashion. Our records for Nixon appointees end in 1995, the year
after Justice Blackmun retired to leave Rehnquist as the last Nixon appointee
remaining on the bench.129
We extend this method to each president appointing two or more Justic-
es and compute the aggregate rates of agreement for all Justices sitting to-
gether in a given year.130 The result is a time series of agreement rates for
each presidential group. Turning back to Nixon appointees, for instance, in
year two they agreed 92% of the time. By year five, this rate declined to
84%, and by year ten it continued to fall to 77%. To compare numbers for all
presidents, we average the separate time series in event time. Thus, the year
one average plotted below reflects an average of all year one agreement rates
across presidents, and the year two average reflects an average of all year two
agreement rates across presidents, and so on.
Figure 13 below plots average percentage of agreement by a president's
appointees on the vertical axis against time they sit together on the horizontal
axis.
126. See Supreme Court Nominations, Present-] 789, supra note 41.
127. Id.
128. See Rehnquist Court (1986-1987), OYEZ: U.S. SUPREME CT. MEDIA, http://
www.oyez.org/courts/rehnquist/rehnl (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
129. See Rehnquist Court (1994-2005), OYEZ: U.S. SUPREME CT. MEDIA, http:
//www.oyez.org/courts (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
130. As before, this agreement rate reflects only non-unanimous cases.
1038 [Vol. 76
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Figure 13:
Average Rate ofAgreement with Fellow Justices
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As the plot shows, percentages of agreement follow a general downward
trend. Justices the same president appoints tend to agree at a 70-75% rate
during their first five years on the bench together. This rate falls into the 65-
70% range during years six through fifteen and declines to around 60% for
groups of appointees with paired voting records exceeding fifteen years. We
base these calculations on records for appointees of thirteen presidents whose
voting records extended past year fifteen.' 3' And, at the ten and five year
levels, we use records for appointees of nineteen and twenty presidents, re-
spectively.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that Justices drift. On
average, groups of appointees vote together more frequently during their ini-
tial years on the bench than they do later on. Our study of drift reveals anoth-
er dimension in which Justices' voting patterns depart from executive prefer-
ences.
131. The thirteen presidents are: Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses
Grant, Benjamin Harrison, Grover Cleveland (both administrations), Theodore Roo-
sevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Warren Harding, Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon,
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and William Clinton. A few of these records,
such as those for FDR's appointees, have gaps for years between the end of our data
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V. CONCLUSION
Supreme Court appointments are one of the most important questions
facing a president. Alexander Bickel captured the sense of uncertainty sur-
rounding appointments long ago: "You shoot an arrow into a far-distant fu-
ture when you appoint a Justice .... And not the man himself can tell you
what he will think about some of the problems that he will face."1 32 We now
know that this uncertainty is empirically well-founded. It is borne out by
Justices' overall voting records since at least 1838. The president's odds of
appointing a Justice who sides with appointees of his party have been no bet-
ter than a coin flip. By extending the study of voting records to a longer his-
torical time period, we also show that these odds have not changed during
periods of divided government.
Many prominent examples of presidential disappointments on overall
votes or key cases were not the product of an opposing-party Senate. Instead
these examples are a part of a larger trend of failure in a significant portion of
appointments. Justices whose votes are at odds with executive preferences
may tend to grow more extreme over time. When we plot patterns of agree-
ment over time, we also see declines in percentages of agreement that are
consistent with contemporary accounts of ideological drift.
Justices who disappoint presidents with their overall voting records are
not historical aberrations. Instead, this phenomenon has continued to occur at
a high frequency since 1838. History provides ample reason to question as-
sertions that appointments bring the Court in line with majoritarian views. It
should give serious pause to voters who go the polls expecting to elect the
Supreme Court.
132. PERETTl, supra note 22, at 112 (quoting Judgment on a Justice, TIME, May
23, 1969, at 23, 24) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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APPENDIX: DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF
DATA COLLECTION PROCESS
We deployed eighteen University of Michigan students to gather and
code voting records for each of these cases. We used a double-entry coding
system to ensure the accuracy of our students' work. 133
We started by looking up each case listed on the Supreme Court's Cita-
tion Finderl 34 in an index of opinions the Supreme Court Historical Society
prepared.' 35 The index provides a comprehensive list of opinions each Justice
authored. It further classifies the opinions into seven different categories:
opinions of the court, opinions announcing judgment, concurrences, dissents,
separate opinions, statements, and opinions authored as circuit justices.136
We used this information to sort our cases into two broad categories:
unanimous and non-unanimous decisions. We treated all cases with a non-
majority opinion as non-unanimous. This method allows us to compare our
cases with an identically sorted subset of cases in the Supreme Court Data-
base.1 37
Our data set may be broader than the Supreme Court Database in two
minor dimensions. First, we found a handful of decisions listed on the Case
Citation Finder that are orders rather than full opinions.138 Because older
Reporters did not publish these decisions separately at the back of the book,
authors of the Case Citation Finder sorted through Reporters and, where pos-
sible, excluded orders or short per curiam opinions without substantial legal
reasoning.1 39 This sorting also means that the Citation Finder's list of histori-
133. This required at least two students to independently review and code voting
information for each case. If both students independently entered matching code for a
case, it was included in the data set without further review. If two students coded a
case differently, a third student reviewed the case for coding errors and attempted to
resolve the coding dispute. If the third student could not resolve the coding dispute,
he or she left a detailed note and the case was reviewed and coded by a co-author of
this Article.
134. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
135. See generally SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17.
136. Id. at xviii-xxii.
137. Thus, we reject unanimity where a Justice issues a "regular concurrence" -
i.e., joins the majority opinion but concurs to note some exception from the majority's
reasoning. Although the Supreme Court Database treats such cases as unanimous, see
CODEBOOK, supra note 43, at 73 its detailed coding allows us to treat them as non-
unanimous for purposes of our analysis.
138. See, e.g., Wood v. Richards, 131 U.S. Appx. Xcviii (1870) (Citation Finder
lists this "opinion" postponing hearing on motion for additional security due to lack of
proper notice.).
139. Interview with Kristine Fallen, Co-Author of the Case Citation Finder at the
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions (Nov. 5, 2008) (notes on file with author).
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cal per curiam opinions is close to the subset of per curiam opinions in the
Supreme Court database. (The Supreme Court Database includes all per curi-
am opinions for cases in which the Court held oral argument or provided an
explanation of its reasoning. 140) Thus, any difference in coverage that exists is
likely minimal, and so is its effect. Cases that result in orders or cursory per
curiam opinions are likely to be unanimous. They would not have any effect
on data showing levels of agreement in non-unanimous decisions.
For all non-unanimous decisions, we looked up each dissent, concur-
rence, separate opinion, or statement on-line in the LEXIS United States Su-
preme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition. We coded all Justices agreeing with a
non-majority opinion other than a judgment. To simplify students' work, we
instructed them to follow the following conventions: 1. Code agreement
only for Justices who had not themselves written an opinion. 41 2. Look for
agreement with a particular author, rather than opinion, to avoid confusion in
cases where the index labeled an opinion differently than LEXIS.
The cornerstone of this analysis is agreement between two Justices. Our
coding uses a strict and readily comparable measure. For our data, we coded
a Justice as agreeing with another Justice's opinion only if he himself had not
written an opinion. This coding identifies not only votes on the disposition of
a casel42 but also includes valuable information about coalitions of Justices
who adopted the exact same rationale for resolving a case. The same test can
140. See CODEBOOK, supra note 43, at 59 (describing variable 43 - decision-
Type).
141. A Justice who was not listed as authoring an opinion by silently agreeing
with two other opinions was coded as joining a separate opinion. In Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen, for example, four dissenting Justices would have rejected the argument
that the New York Workmen's Compensation Act conflicted with federal law. 244
U.S. 205, 219-55 (1917). We coded Brandeis and Clarke as joining a statement be-
cause they were the only Justices who joined Holmes' and Pitney's separate dissents
silently and without qualification. Id. at 255. This provides a precise record of voting
coalitions in cases where neither Holmes nor Pitney managed to write an opinion
capturing his colleagues' complete rationale. We applied the same analysis to a hand-
ful of cases in the Supreme Court Database where a Justice was listed as dissenting
without authoring or joining an opinion. In those cases, we treated the Justice as the
author of his own opinion.
142. We present votes on the judgment for the majority or minority for over 95%
of cases in which Justices joined a majority opinion, opinion announcing judgment,
concurrence, or dissent. This excludes a relatively small category of cases where the
index listed Justices as issuing separate opinions or statements without specifying
whether they voted to affirm or reverse a particular decision. We did not ask our
undergraduate students to make this complex legal determination for these cases.
Thus, we did not count votes on these separate opinions or statements in our results
looking at majority and minority coalitions formed by votes to affirm or reverse.
1042 [Vol. 76
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be applied to data in the Supreme Court Database, as it also records all Justic-
es who wrote opinions and all votes in agreement with a particular opinion.143
Our coding of non-unanimous cases left a body of unanimous decisions,
which did not require students to code individual Justices' votes. We deter-
mined and coded these unanimous voting coalitions based on the membership
of the Court at the time of its decision. Thus, we presumed agreement among
Justices if they were sitting on the Court at the time it issued a unanimous
decision. We used the same method to identify Justices joining a majority
opinion or an opinion announcing judgment (as LEXIS typically did not list
individual Justices joining this second type of opinion).
We identified the group of Justices on the Court as of the date of a par-
ticular decision according to records on the composition of the Court and
dates of decisions. While the Court typically has had nine seats, this number
fluctuated in the 1860s.'" In 1863, Congress added a tenth seat.145 Three
years later it attempted to cut the Court back to seven seats (by taking away
Andrew Johnson's power to fill vacancies).146 Congress restored the Court to
nine seats in 1869.147 The number of Justices voting on a particular case also
148depends on how quickly a vacancy is filled and the number of recusals.
We calculated the composition of the Court using information that the
Oyez Project's Supreme Court website provides about different natural
courts.149 Oyez records a new natural court each time a Justice joins or leaves
the Court. 5 0 We did not code a Justice as joining a majority or plurality deci-
143. The Supreme Court Database's detailed voting records show (1) whether a
Justice wrote his or her own opinion; (2) his or her vote in the case (majority, plurali-
ty, dissent, or concurrence) and (3) for concurring and dissenting opinions, which
Justices joined a concurrence or dissent authored by a particular Justice. CODEBOOK,
supra note 43, at 65 (describing variable 49 - voteUnclear), 73-74 (describing varia-
bles 57 and 58 - vote and opinion), 77-78 (describing variables 61 and 62 - firstA-
greement and secondAgreement).




148. We coded recusals that we found in the course of reviewing votes for select
cases. Lack of uniform language reporting recusal precluded us from running a com-
prehensive search for all recusals.
149. Browse Justices, OYEZ: U.S. SUPREME CT. MEDIA, http://www.oyez.org
/courts/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011). We turned to the Compendium's listing of re-
tirement and death dates (in its table of natural courts) to resolve what appeared to be
two discrepancies in departure dates Oyez listed for Justices Bradley and Hughes
(first departure). See COMPENDIUM, supra note 12, at 405 tbl.5-2.
150. This is known as a strong natural court. CODEBOOK, supra note 43, at 38. As
noted in the Codebook, "no convention exists as to the dates on which" natural courts
begin and end. Id. For our purposes, however, Oyez's listing of strong natural courts
was most helpful because it focuses on Justices who are actually serving at the time of
a particular decision. Id.
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sion if it was issued on the day he joined the Court, retired, resigned, or died.
As a further check on accuracy, we reviewed cases to see that they had the
proper number of Justices for a given year.
We also gathered more detailed information about the date the Court is-
sued a decision for years when the Court's composition changed. Dates of
decision allowed us to identify which decisions pre- and post-dated a particu-
lar judicial appointment. For decisions issued through 1881, we used "Dates
of Supreme Court Decisions and Arguments," a database on the Supreme
Court's website.' 5 1 For later-decided cases, we looked up dates of decision
for all non-unanimous cases used in our study.152 We also looked up specific
dates for a series of appendix cases in Reporter 131, because they were deci-
sions issued many years before the reporter was published. Gathering addi-
tional information about dates of decision allowed us to calculate coalitions
of Justices for majority and plurality opinions.
151. See Anne Ashmore, U.S. SUPREME COURT LIBRARY, DATES OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS AND ARGUMENTS (2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov/opinions/datesofdecisions.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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